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et al.: Recent Cases

Recent Cases
AUTOMOBILES-ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE IN CHAIN COLLISION
IN MISSOURI
Gass v. Knittig

Plaintiff was injured in a chain reaction collision on a four-lane highway in
St. Louis County. The car in which he was riding was in the outer southbound
lane. Defendant No. 1 was driving first in a line of cars in the inside northbound
lane. Having made the proper signals, she slowed to a stop to let plaintiff's
car clear the intersection in which she wished to turn left. Almost immediately
after her car had stopped it was struck by the car following, which was driven
by defendant No. 2. He, in turn, was struck from the rear by the car of defendant No. 3 (appellant). At this time defendant No. 4, who had been driving
in the outer northbound lane at about 40 m.p.h., turned into the inside lane,
about 50 to 75 feet behind appellant, in order to pass a truck he had been following. He had not previously noticed the three cars ahead and, unable to stop or
re-enter the outer lane, swerved to his left to avoid the pile-up. He collided headon with the car in which plaintiff was riding.
Plaintiff brought suit for his injuries against all the drivers of the northbound
cars. Defendant No. 1 received a directed verdict and defendant No. 2 a jury
verdict. 2 Defendants No. 3 and No. 4 were held liable for concurring negligence.
Only defendant No. 3 appealed.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against appellant on
the basis that her negligence was not actionable as to plaintiff. Although finding
appellant negligent in running into the rear end of defendant No. 2s car, the
court concluded her negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
The court pointed out that the act of each defendant must be a responsible
cause of the accident. It is irrelevant that a defendant is negligent to others if his
negligence is not harmful to plaintiff.3 From this the court reasoned that appellant's
negligence was not harmful to plaintiff because his injuries would have resulted
anyway. It was necessary for appellant to stop, whether lawfully or negligently,
and it was defendant No. 4s failure and inability to stop in turn that resulted in
the collision injuring plaintiff.
The court went even further in relieving appellant of liability by pointing out
she had done her utmost to prevent the accident. The court reasoned that defendant No. 4, in attempting to pass the truck, needed every bit of time and
1. 396 S.W.2d 26 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Id. at 27. From this it may be assumed that these parties' conduct was
not negligent to plaintiff.
3. Id. at 28.
(449)
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space he could possibly get to bring his car under control. By slamming into defendant No. 2's car rather than slowing gradually, appellant allowed defendant
No. 4 the ultimate limit of space and time. Rather than breaching any duty to
plaintiff, appellant discharged it with "the last full measure of devotion." 4
But was appellant's negligence actually irrelevant as to plaintiff? Could not
her negligent conduct really have been the proximate cause of his injuries? It is
generally accepted that a negligent act cannot be the proximate cause of an accident if the accident would have occurred even though the particular defendant
drove carefully. 5 The conduct must produce the injury through a natural and
continuous sequence which is unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. 0 The
St. Louis Court of Appeals seemed to treat the negligent conduct of defendant No.
4 as the sole cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiff.1 But the facts of the case
could be construed to indicate appellant's negligence was a proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries by concurring with the negligence of defendant No. 4.
Appellant came to a suddent stop on a lane of a highway by slamming into
the car in front and giving no warning to the traffic behind. The court found
this was negligence on her part, so it may be assumed that by the exercise of care
appellant could have slowed to a stop giving the proper signals. What effect
might such a careful stop with the attendant warning signals have had on defendant No. 4's actions?
Appellant was going from 30 to 35 m.p.h. s and her total stopping distance at
that speed would have been from 114 to 145 feet from the point of perception. 0
This is the approximate distance she would have traveled from the time of signaling
if she had exercised care and recognized the danger and if she had begun signaling
at the earliest point of time. Add that figure to the 50 or 75 feet between appellant
and defendant No. 4 when the latter started to pass the truck in front of him,
and it is possible that defendant No. 4, going 40 m.p.h., would have had time to
stop, had he had a warning signal when appellant should have first realized there
was a necessity to stop.10
It is even possible that if defendant No. 4 had seen warning brake lights on
appellant's car ahead, he would have never attempted to pass the truck by pulling
1
4. Id. at 29.
5. 5 Am. JUR. Automobiles § 659 (1936); 5A AM. JUR. Automobiles and
Highway Traffic § 236 (1936).
6. SA AM. JUR., op. cit. supra note 5, § 236.
7. At page 28 of 396 S.W.2d, the court states: "We think it demonstrable
in this case that defendant No. 3 [appellant] did not violate any duty she owed
to plaintiff and that her collision with No. 2 was in nowise causally connected
with the ensuing accident between plaintiff and No. 4." This indicates that the
court must have considered defendant No. 4's negligence at least an intervening
cause in relation to the negligent conduct of appellant in the chain collision.
8. Gass v. Knittig, supra note 1, at 27.
9. AM. JUR. 2d Desk Book, Doc. No. 176 (1962).
10. By the Uniform Table of Driver Stopping Distances, cited note 9 supra,
defendant No. 4's total stopping distance would have been 178 feet. It seems
possible that if he had timely warning from appellant, he would have had time
in the exercise of reasonable care to come to a stop behind appellant, thus avoiding a collision altogether.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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into the inside lane. His failure to see the pile-up ahead was negligent; but had
appellant made the proper signal, there might not have been that failure on the
part of defendant No. 4. Thus, in two different respects, appellant's negligence in
failing to signal could have concurred with the negligence of defendant No. 4 to
cause plaintiff's injuries and constitute a proximate cause.11
Appellant's actions might have been the proximate cause in yet another way.
If she had noticed the collision ahead and swerved into the outside lane to avoid
it, she would not have added her car to the pile-up, thus allowing defendant No. 4
more time and space in which to stop his car.
It seems possible, therefore, that that appellant's negligence could have caused
plaintiff's injuries. It also seems possible that negligence was a breach of duty
owed to plaintiff and thus was actionable to plaintiff.
The duties owed by appellant were numerous, as they are for all drivers.
Operators of motor vehicles in Missouri are held to the standard of the highest
degree of care.12 They are held liable for failure to give a warning signal before
stopping in front of traffic,' 3 an action required by state statute when stopping
or checking the speed of their cars would reasonably affect the movement of
other cars. 14 Drivers following other traffic must keep a lookout to observe the
cars ahead and their movements, keep their cars under control to prevent running
into them if they should slow or stop, and keep a sufficient distance behind to
avoid danger in case of a sudden stopping.15 Did appellant owe any of these
duties to plaintiff?
Besides the general duty "to so control his [her] car as to endeavor to avoid

injury to people [s~he might meet or pass on the highway," 16 appellant had the
duty to refrain from conduct which could foreseeably result in injury to plaintiff.

It is not necessary that appellant have anticipated the particular injury, manner
in which it occurred, or person to whom it occurred.'
Appeals held in Setzer v. Ulrich:

7

As the St. Louis Court of

11. 7 AM. JUR. 2d A'utomobiles and Highway Traffic § 370 (1963).
12. § 304.010(1), RSMo 1959.
13. For cases holding defendants liable for negligence see: Terrell v. McKnight,
360 Mo. 19, 226 S.W.2d 714 (1950); Woods v. Chinn, 224 S.W.2d 583 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1949); Matthews v. Mound City Cab Co., 205 S.W.2d 243 (St. L. Mo. App.
1947); Bowman v. Moore, 237 Mo. App. 1163, 167 S.W.2d 675 (K.C. Ct. App.
1942); Setzer v. Ulrich, 90 S.W.2d 154 (St. L. Mo. App. 1936); Ritz v. Cousins
Lumber Co., 227 Mo. App. 1167, 59 S.W.2d 1072 (1933). See also: Schroeder v.
Rawlings, 344 Mo. 630, 127 S.W.2d 678 (1939), aff'd, 348 Mo. 790, 155 S.W.2d 189
(1941); O'Donnell v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 246 S.W.2d 539 (St. L. Mo. App.
1952). For cases holding plaintiffs liable for contributory negligence see: White
v. Rohrer, 267 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1954); Robb v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 352
Mo. 566, 178 S.W.2d 443 (1944); Berthold v. Danz, 27 S.W.2d 448 (St. L. Mo. App.
1930); Schreiber v. Andrews, 234 S.W. 862 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921).
14. § 304.019(1), (4), RSMo 1959.
15. Terrell v. McKnight, supra note 13; Matthews v. Mound City Cab Co.,
supra note 13.
16. Ritz v. Cousins Lumber Co., supra note 13, at 1172, 59 S.W.2d at 1075.
17. Bowman v. Moore, supra note 13; Setzer v. Ulrich, supra note 13; Ritz v.
Cousins Lumber Co., supra note 13.
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It is only essential that in the exercise of due care he could or might have
foreseen or anticipated that some injury might result. In other words, if
a person does an act, and he knows, or by the exercise of reasonable foresight should have known, that in the event of a subsequent occurrence,
which is not unlikely to happen, injury may result from his act, and such
subsequent occurrence does happen and injury does result, the act committed 8is negligent, and will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the
injury.'
Not only did appellant owe a duty to plaintiff as a traveler on the highway,
but also she had a duty to avoid causing the injury to plaintiff which she reasonably could have foreseen. Concurrent negligence, common to these chain reaction collisions, often involves a sudden and negligent stop by one driver which
is compounded by the negligence of the several drivers behind, who are following too closely or are failing to keep a proper lookout.' 9 Appellant's and defendant
No. 4's negligence, quite possibly concurring in this manner, seems to have
breached a duty to persons in the car approaching in the opposite lane and to
have resulted in plaintiff's injuries.
The court in Gass reversed the judgment against appellant on the basis
that no case could be made against her, not only on the theory submitted to the
jury,20 but on any theory. 21 Although it took a practical and most interesting
view as to appellants liability for plaintiff's injuries, it would seem that a case
could have been made against appellant on the theory of concurrent negligence.
If the court had remanded the case, the jury could have determined whether or not
the facts warranted finding that appellants acts constituted concurrent negligence
resulting in injury to the plaintiff.
HELEN G. BREIDENSTEIN

18. 90 S.W.2d 154, 156 (St. L. Mo. App. 1936).
19. For a discussion of the negligence of a driver following another car and a
comparison of the Rear-End Collision Doctrine in Missouri and in Kansas see
Jacobson, The Rear-End Collision Doctrine as a Theory of Negligence in Kansas,
28 U. KAN. Cn¢ L. REv. 41 (1959-60) and cases cited: State ex rel. Spears v.

McCullen, 357 Mo. 686, 210 S.W.2d 68 (1948); Jones v. Central States Oil Co.,
350 Mo. 91, 164 S.W.2d 914 (1942); Richardson v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 288 Mo.
258, 231 S.W. 938 (1921); Schafstette v. St. Louis & M.R.R. Co., 175 Mo. 142,
74 S.W. 826 (1903); Doggendorf v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 333 S.W.2d 302
(St. L. Mo. App. 1960); Hughes v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W.2d 360
(St. L. Mo. App. 1952); Jones v. Austin, 154 S.W.2d 378 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941);
Hollensbe v. Pevely Dairy Co., 38 S.W.2d 273 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931).
20. The plaintiff's main instruction to the jury was on the rear end collision
doctrine.
21. Gass v. Knittig, supra note 1, at 29.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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LABOR RELATIONS-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE
LIBEL ACTIONS
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 1141

Petitioner Linn, an assistant general manager of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., filed this suit against the Union, two of its officers and a
Pinkerton employee, one Doyle. The compaint alleged that during a campaign to
organize Pinkerton's employees in Detroit, the respondents (defendants below)
had circulated among the employees leaflets accusing petitioner of lying to
Pinkerton's Saginaw employees, depriving them of their right to vote in NLRB
elections, and charging that they had been robbed of pay increases, presumably
by petitioner. The leaflets also expressed confidence that the "Saginaw men will
file criminal charges," and that "Somebody may go to Jail!" 2 The complaint alleged
that the statements were false and that defendants knew they were false. It did
not allege actual or special damage but prayed for the recovery of one million
dollars on the ground that the accusations were libel per se. All respondents except Doyle moved to dismiss, asserting that the subject matter was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Prior to this action Pinkerton had filed 8(b) (1) (A) charges under National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section with the NLRB. The Regional Director refused to issue a complaint on the ground that the Union was not responsible for
the distribution of the leaflets.
The District Court dismissed this complaint on the ground that the NLRB
had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court of Appeals for the
6th Circuit affirmed.3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a
five to four decision.4 The Court stated, "[Wlhere either party to a labor dispute
circulates false and defamatory statements during a Union organizing campaign,
the court does have jurisdiction to apply state remedies if the complaint pleads
and proves that the statements were made with malice and injured him." 5 Petitioner was given leave to amend his complaint to conform to these requirements.
The general rule regarding federal pre-emption in labor relations is that if
the conduct in question is arguably either protected by section 7 or prohibited by
section 8 of the NLRA, the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to settle the dispute.6
The purpose of such a policy is to effectuate the Congressional intent to have a
uniform national labor policy encouraging collective bargaining, administered by
a board of special competence.
1. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
2. Id. at 56.
3. 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
4. 381 U.S. 923 (1965). Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion and was
joined by Justices Stewart, Brennan, White and Harlan. Justice Black wrote a
dissenting opinion as did Justice Fortas, who was joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Douglas.
5. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1, at 55.
6. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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However, there are exceptions to the general rule, judicially created on a caseby-case basis. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council u. GarmonT announced that state
remedies had not been done away with where the conduct involved was "a merely
peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act" or "touched interests
so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling Congressional direction," intent to deprive the states of power to act could
not be inferred.
The dispute in the noted case focused upon the scope of the Garmon exception. The majority believed that malicious libel was only a "peripheral concern"
of the Labor Management Relations Act s because the Board is not empowered
to redress private injury. The damage sustained by the plaintiff in a libel suit
is a private wrong, while the unfair labor practice procedure9 resolves only the
labor dispute. Under Justice Clark's analysis, the two remedies are not conflicting,
will not lead to inconsistent results and do not overlap because they deal with
two distinctly different interests.
Justice Fortas, for the minority, felt that since the statements made about
Linn were charges related to his occupational responsibility during an organizational campaign by respondents union, the alleged defamation was very definitely
part of a labor dispute and was therefore not merely a "peripheral concern" of
the Act.' 0
The essential conflict concerning the "overriding state interest" requirement
of Garmon is between the desire to tolerate rough speech in labor disputes and the
state's interest in protecting its citizens from libels. Justice Clark concedes that
Congress intended to encourage free debate in labor disputes,11 but insists that
it never intended to tolerate malicious libel which is never constitutionally protected.12 "iTlhe use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises
of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social
or political change is to be effected." 13 Moreover, even where objectionable language has been tolerated in unfair labor practice proceedings, the Board has indicated that the result might have been different had there been "actual malice,"
an "intent to falsify" or a "malevolent desire to injure."' 4 The majority opinion
7. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 6.
8. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1, at 61.
9. The Board may set aside an election if the defamatory language has been
such as to misrepresent a material fact, opportunity for reply has been lacking,
and the misrepresentation has had an impact on the free choice of the employees
participating in the election. See Hollywood Ceramics Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 221, at
223-224 (1962); F. H. Snow Canning Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 714, at 717-718 (1957).
10. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1 at 70.
Justice Fortas went on to say, however, that "The foregoing considerations do not
apply to the extent that the use of verbal weapons during labor disputes is not
confined to any issue in the dispute, or involves a person who is neither party to
nor agent of a party to the dispute. In such instances, perhaps the courts ought to
be free to redress whatever private wrong has been suffered."
11. Id. at 61-62.
12. Id. at 63.
13. Id. at 67, quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
14. Id. at 61.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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stated that freedom of speech does not become unduly restricted by allowing suits
such as this one since the right to maintain the action is limited by the requirements imposed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:' 5 proof of actual malice and
damages. 16 Also significant is the fact that if a defamed individual is denied state
17
remedies he can obtain no relief for his injury.
Justice Black insists that there are no overriding state interests which would
prevent pre-emption because it was not the intent of Congress to "purify the language of labor disputes, [but to] bring about agreements by collective bargaining."' 8 To allow libel suits in such circumstances would impede fruitful collective
bargaining by creating feelings of personal vengeance. 19
Justice Fortas challenged Justice Clark's interpretation of the Garmon exception regarding "overriding state interest." He contends that never has the
Court allowed an independent judicial remedy in an area arguably subject to NLRB
cognizance where there was no violence, threat of violence or intimidation,20 and
that the state's interest in protecting its citizens from libel is not such an interest as will prevent pre-emption. 21 Congress did not intend for state courts to
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1, at 61.
"[The exercise of state jurisdiction is a] peripheral concern of the LMRA, provided
it is limited to redressing libel issued with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false."
17. Id. at 64: "The Board's lack of concern with the 'personal' injury cause
by malicious libel, together with its inability to provide redress to the maligned
party, vitiates the ordinary arguments for pre-emption."
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id. He also reiterates that all libel suits abridge freedom of speech.
20. Id. at 69. These actions are to be distinguished in kind from proceedings
under NLRA section 301. That provision is specifically directed to suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a union. See, e.g., Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Zdanok v. Glidden, 288
F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
In Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S.
946 (1963), the Court held that a Union could not punish its members for libelling
other members. However, there was dictum to the effect that "libelous statements
may be made the bases of civil suit between those concerned." See also note 32,
infra.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), allowed a
state action for damages for loss of wages, mental and physical suffering brought
by an employee who was expelled from a union for falsely attacking another man's
character. The Court held that although the conduct was arguably an 8(b) (2)
violation, the plaintiff's rights were in contract and the NLRB could therefore
grant no relief.
21. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1, at 69. An
examination of the cases cited on this precise point by the Court in Garmon
gives some support to Mr. Justice Fortas's position. All of the disputes in those
cases involved violence or threats of violence: UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634
(1958) (picket line blocking plaintiff's access to work; threats of bodily harm;
standing in front of auto so as to block entrance to plant); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (parking lot strewn with tacks; tacks scattered in
driveway of plant manager's home and homes of non-strikers; threat to "wipe
the sidewalk" with plant manager; harassment of manager by shouting and telephoning his home; snake put in plant; tires of non-strikers' cars punctured, and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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have jurisdiction over such libel suits because "lusty speech provides a useful
safety valve for the tensions which often accompany such controversies." 22 He
pointed out that labor-management disputes take place within a unique framework
and implied that those who participate understand the language used and that
the Court's decision threatens the "equilibrium" which has been achieved in the
23
successful resolution of union-management controversies.
Justice Fortas is convinced that the protection afforded by requiring proof
of malice and injury is illusory. He says that "malice" is subjective in its meaning,
what it is depends on the ingenuity of trial counsel and the predelictions of judge
and jury. "Injury," similarly, is "not limited to physical trauma." 24 He summarized his views:
In a libel suit, the outcome is determined by standards alien to the subject matter of labor relations, by considerations which do not take into
account the complex and subtle values that are at stake, and by a jury
unfamiliar with the quality of rhetoric customary in labor disputes. The
outcome, in fact, is more apt to reflect immediate community attitudes
toward unionization than appreciation for the underlying, long-term perplexities
of the interplay of management and labor in a democratic so25
ciety.
The effect of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of A'merica, Local 114 remains to be seen. The Court's opinion maintains that collective bargaining will not
be disrupted by allowing libel suits because they deal with a problem totally
distinct from labor disputes-individual injury. The majority also met the argument that its decision will result in an avoidance by allegedly defamed parties of
appropriate Board remedies for conduct that is also an unfair labor practice. That
is, injured persons will not seek an administrative remedy when they know they
can sue in court for money damages. Clark says this will not follow because, just
as the Board cannot redress private injury in this context, neither can a judicial
tribunal resolve the labor dispute. Therefore, the Board remedies will still be
sought, since both parties must continue their day-to-day working relationship,2 0
more); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (mass
picketing obstructing ingress to and egress from the plant; threatening employees
who desired to work and their families with physical injury); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (threats and intimidation of employer's officers and employees with violence to such a degree that employer was compelled to abandon all its projects in that area).
22. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1, at 73.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 71. Moreover, Justice Fortas says that the alleged libel in this
case" . . . is hardly incendiary. To the experienced eye, it is pale and anemic when
compared with the rich and colorful charges freely exchanged in the heat of many
labor disputes."
25. Id. at 71.
26. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1, at 64.
Justice Clark also expressed his view that the harm for which a complainant may
recover "may include general injury to reputation, consequent mental suffering,
alienation of associates, specific items of pecuniary loss, or whatever form of harm
would be recognized by state tort law."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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Clark does not seem at all convinced himself that his requirements of malice and
injury will protect small employers and unions from possible extinction because of
a large libel judgment.2 7 Fortas feels that these requirements afford little or no
protection. Because of the differences between the context of labor disputes and
the framework within which ordinary libel suits arise, and because of the inability
of juries to comprehend the situation, he feels that the stability of small employers
and unions is endangered by this decision.
Linn unquestionably broadens the Garmon exception in favor of the exercise
of state jurisdiction. It is not clear exactly whether Clark is saying that judicial
remedy is available because (1) libel in this context is not arguably within the
protection of section 7 or the prohibitions of section 8,28 or (2) even though it is
arguably within the Board's jurisdiction, the state's interest is so great that libel
suits will be allowed notwithstanding the general rule.29
There are questions of both law and policy involved. Questions of law are usually
decided by reference to legislative history, statutory interpretation and prior
decisions. In this area the legislative history is vague; the language of the statute
is no help. However, the language of the prior decisions does not appear prima
facie to support the Court's conclusions as to what is the meaning of the GarnerGarmon general rule and the exceptions to pre-emption.30 Questions of policy are
rarely susceptible of objective analysis and criticism. The crucial point, recognized
and discussed by both majority and dissenting justices, is that uniform national
labor policy is of paramount importance, and that judicial remedies cannot be
allowed which will disrupt that policy too much.31 Clark does not feel that it will

27. Id. at 67:
We believe that under the rules laid down here it can be appropriately re-dressed without curtailment of state libel remedies beyond the actual
needs of national labor policy. However, if experience shows that a more
complete curtailment, even a total one, should be necessary to prevent
impairment of that policy, the Court will be free to reconsider today's
holding. We deal here not with a constitutional issue but solely with the
degree to which state remedies have been pre-empted by the Act.
28. Id. at 61: "In such cases the one issuing such material forfeits his protection under the Act," and at 63: "The injury that the statement might cause to
an individual's reputation-whether he be an employer or union official-has no
relevance to the Board's function."
29. See Id., at 62: "We . . . conclude that a State's concern with redressing
malicious libel is 'so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility' that it fits
within the exception specifically carved out by Garmon."
30. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
1297, 1310 (1954). Twelve years ago Cox interpreted the pre-emption doctrine to
apply whether the state restriction sought to be enforced by court action is statutory or common law and whether it purports to constitute adjudication of private
rights or public regulation.
31. See Wollet, State Power to Regulate Labor Relations, 33 Wash. L. Rev.
364 (1958), where it is contended that the crucial consideration is the threat to
national labor policy. Wollet suggests that a case like UAW v. Russell, supra note
23, involving mass picketing and threats of violence to a worker if he entered the
plant, posed such a threat, whereas the situation involved in Gonzales, supra note
20, did not.
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do serious damage to allow libel actions, 2 but has reserved the right to change
his mind if problems arise in the future. To Fortas, the danger is apparent and
imminent.
It appears that the Court could have better compromised the competing interests by using a more restrictive test for allowing libel suits, if such modification
of the pre-emption doctrine is needed at all. If the defamatory statements have
been disseminated outside the labor-management circle so as to come to the attention of the complainant's social acquaintances, persons not hardened to the
"lusty speech" of labor disputes, perhaps a judicial remedy for libel could be allowed. The rationale is that the defamed person is not likely to be severely damaged
within his business world where labor, management, Congress and the courts all
wish to promote "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate that "may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks." 33
On the contrary, should his non-business associates, in a world which does not
tolerate such utterances, be made aware of the false accusations, then and only
then could it be said that the state's interest is "overriding." A better, more conservative approach to resolving the policy question, therefore, would appear to
be the adoption of a rule that unless the libel has been actually disseminated by
radio, television, newspaper or any other means reasonably calculated to spread
beyond the participants in the dispute, state remedies have been pre-empted. The
federal case law,s 4 however, until this decision, appears to be on the side of federal
pre-emption except where the state's interest is the prevention of violence. Nevertheless, since Linn is such a departure from precedent anyway, it would seem to
have broadened the Garmon exception sufficiently to permit a more restrictive
policy rule in the future.
MIcHaEL

A.

L mRum

32. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations: I, 59 Col. L. Rev. 6 (1959) would undoubtedly disagree. If
the conduct is neither prohibited by § 8 [and in Linn, the Regional Director
apparently thought it was not] nor protected by § 7 [as Clark contends libel is
not], he says, at page 40:
The states would then be awarding damages for activities which are
neither prohibited nor protected. In this context, there is more force to
the claim that state additions to the substantive, as opposed to the
remedial, law of labor relations would derange the balance struck by the
federal act. If, in accordance with Garner, the interest in centralized and
uniform interpretation precludes the states from granting parallel remedies
for activity apparently prohibited by federal law, it would appear, a
fortiori, that the states are barred from applying additional substantive
standards and thereby limiting conduct ungoverned by the national act.
33. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, supra note 1, at 62.
34. But see state decisions contra: Blum v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J.
389, 201 A.2d 382 (1965); Meyer v. Joint Council 53, Teamsters, 416 Pa. 401, 206
A.2d 382 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 897 (1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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INNKEEPER'S LIABILITY FOR THEFT OF A GUEST'S AUTOMOBILE
Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Royale Investment Co.1
Roy Scott, upon arriving at defendant's hotel to become an overnight guest,
turned his automobile over to the hotel doorman. The doorman gave Scott a
claim check containing a disclaimer clause 2 and then parked Scott's automobile on
a hotel lot. The particular lot was some distance from the hotel and was generally
used by persons attending functions at the hotel rather than by overnight guests.
The lot was lighted but left open and unattended from 1:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.
During this period the car was stolen and wrecked. After paying Scott's claim of
$603.32, plaintiff insurance company sued defendant by right of subrogation.
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on grounds that (1) even if Scott's attention
was called to the disclaimer clause, it could not be construed as relieving defendant from negligence liability; (2) defendant's liability was not limited by section
419.010, RSMo 1959 to 200 dollars, because the statute could not be construed
to include a guest's automobile, and (3) defendant was merely a bailee for hire
of the automobile, making an innkeeper statute inapplicable.
At common law, the great majority of courts held the innkeeper to be virtually
an insurer of a guest's property infra hospitium, i.e. within the protection of the
inn, unless lost or damaged by act of God, public enemy, or fault of the guest.3
A minority of courts held that the innkeeper could relieve himself of liability for
loss of, or damage to, a guest's property infra hospitium by showing freedom from
negligence.4
In the noted case, the fact that Scott's automobile was parked on a lot some
distance from the hotel proper does not prevent the automobile from being infra
hospitium. Numerous early cases hold a guest's goods are infra hospitium though
not within the inn proper. 5 A statement of this rule is found in Maloney v.
1. 393 S.W.2d 43 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
2. "The Hotel assumes no responsibility for cars parked on this lot whether
for the car or damages or contents therein. We do not have an attendant at all
times. This ticket is not a receipt. It indicates our arrangement concerning parking. All owners placing automobiles with the Hotel parking lot do so subject to
the above terms and conditions." Id. at 46.
3. Swanner v. Conner Hotel Co., 205 Mo. App. 329, 224 S.W. 123 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1920), 29 AM. JuR. Innkeepers § 81 (1960).
4. 29 AM. Jun. Innkeepers § 81 (1960).
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. Manuel, 91 Me. 274, 39 Atl. 1030 (1898) (innkeeper
directed guest to put horse in stable not part of the inn); Hilton v. Adams, 71 Me.
19 (1879) (cattle in pasture outside the inn); Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N.H. 553
(1856) (horse killed by another horse in defendant's stable); Hallenbake v. Fish,
8 Wend. 547 (N.Y. 1832) (saddle and bridle in barn); Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns.
R. 174 (N.Y. 1817) (bags of wheat stolen from wagon house); Jones v. Tyler, 3
L.J.K.B. 166 (1834) (gig left in public carriage way by innkeeper's servant).
More recent cases: Park-O-Tell Co. v. Roskamp, 223 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1950);
Merchant's Fire Assur. Corp. v. Zions Corp., 109 Utah 13, 163 P.2d 319 (1945);
Aria v. Bridge House Hotel, Ltd., 137 L.T.R. (n.s.) 299 (1927) (Innkeeper's
servant told guest to park car on hotel lot). For a fact situation identical to
Phoenix see Williams v. Linnitt, 1 K.B. 165 (1951) (holding innkeeper liable).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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BaconO where the guest arrived in town and made arrangements for his baggage
to be delivered to the hotel later. After the guest's baggage was deposited on a
platform in front of the hotel by a transfer company, it was stolen. In holding
the hotel liable, the court stated:
To be infra hospitium, it is not necessary that property should be left
within the walls of the inn, nor within the walls of buildings appurtenant
to the inn, nor yet within the limits of the enclosure surrounding such
buildings.
The court further held that the hotel customarily received the baggage of its guests
on the platform and that the guest's baggage was delivered to the platform in
the customary manner. The baggage being infra hospitium, the hotel was liable.
Other cases hold that mere delivery to the innkeeper's servant, as in the principal case, is enough to bring the property infra hospitium no matter where the
servant later places the goods. 7 Furthermore, it has been held that if the innkeeper's servant directs a guest to leave his property in a certain place, it is
8
enough to bring the property infra tospitiUm.
Thus the fact that Scott's automobile was not within the hotel proper is not
controlling, 9 nor is the fact that the parking lot was not connected to the hotel.10
An innkeeper may be held liable if the guest parks the automobile, 1' or even if the
automobile was parked by someone other than the guest, the innkeeper, or the
12
innkeeper's servant.
The principal case is to be distinguished from Sewell v. Mountain View Hotel,
lnc.'3 where a guest's car was damaged when a drunk, being pursued by police,
crashed his car into the parking lot containing the guest's car. In Sewell, the hotel
made no charge for the parking. The guest could choose the particular lot and
space, and could keep the keys. The guest could use the car at his discretion
without knowledge of the hotel, and the hotel kept no attendant on the lot. In
that case, the hotel was not even a bailee of the automobile, since it neither directed the guest's disposition of the car, nor had custody or possession of it.
While the great majority of courts have held the innkeeper virtually an insurer of a guest's property infra hospitium, many states have enacted statutes
purporting to diminish this absolute liability. Such statutes, when in derogration
of common law, are to be strictly construed.' 4 When an action is brought against
an innkeeper who contends his liability is limited by such a statute, the majority
6.
7.
8.
9.

33 Mo. App. 501 (K.C. Ct. App. 1888).
E.g., Jones v. Tyler, supra note 5.
Aria v. Bridge House Hotel, Ltd., supra note 5.
Cases cited note 5, supra.

10. Ibid.

11. See, Cohen v. Manuel, supra note 5; Aria v. Bridge House Hotel, Ltd.,
supra note 5.

12. Supra note 6.
13. 325 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1959).
14. Missouri cases offer examples of some of the strictest construction. In
Porter v. Gilkey, 57 Mo. 235 (1874) a statute requiring an innkeeper to post
notice in ordinary sized plain English type was held not to be complied with when
print was in small type although the guest could just as easily have read it; In
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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of courts hold that this limitation relates only to an innkeeper's absolute liability
and has no application when the guest's cause of action is based on negligence. 15
Missouri's statute, section 419.010, RSMo 1959, seems an uncommonly poor
example of a statute limiting an innkeeper's liability:
no hotel ... is liable for the loss of any money, jewelry, wearing apparel,
baggage or other property of a guest in a total sum greater than two
hundred dollars, unless the hotel . . . by an agreement in writing . . .
voluntarily assumes a greater liability with reference to such property. As
regards money, jewelry or baggage, an hotel keeper . . . is not liable in
any event for the loss thereof or damage thereto, unless the same was
actually delivered by the guest to him ... in the office of the hotel or inn,
and the receipt thereof acknowledged by the delivery to the guest a claim
check of the hotel . . ., unless the loss or damage occurs through the willful negligence or wrongdoing of the hotel keeper . . . his servants, or employees. This section shall be posted in the office of every hotel and inn and
in every guest room thereof, and unless so posted the same does not apply
in the case of hotel keepers . . . failing to post same.
The court in the principal case, applying the rule of strict construction to the
statute, concluded that "other property" obviously applies to things carried into
the hotel by the guest and does not include a guest's automobile. 16 The wording
of the statute permits no other inference. Thus, under the Missouri statute, a hotel
is in the unusual position of being subject to a higher degree of liability toward a
guest's automobile on a hotel lot than to personal belongings brought into the
hotel. Since no statute relates to the liability of an innkeeper for a guest's automobile, common law absolute liability must attach.
Another deficiency in the Missouri statute is the use of the term "willful
negligence." For a hotel to be liable in excess of 200 dollars for loss or damage to
property of a guest brought into the hotel, there must have been willful negligence
(probably meaning gross negligence). This, besides doing violence to common law
Batterson v. Vogel, 8 Mo. App. 24 (St. L. Ct. App. 1879) where a statute required posting of notice, actual notice was held not to comply with the statute.
See 29 AM. JUR. Innkeepers § 90 (1960).
15. E.g., in Rockhill v. Congress Hotel Co., 237 Ill. App. 98, 86 N.E. 740
(1908), a statute stating that an innkeeper was not liable for money, jewelry, or
precious stones unless delivered to the innkeeper was held to be no bar to a
guest's recovery in negligence where she failed to deliver her valuables to the innkeeper. In Shiman Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska Nat. Hotel Co., 143 Neb. 404, 9
N.W.2d 807 (1943), a jewelry salesman had jewelry in excess of $45,000 stolen
from his trunk. The court held that a statute regulating or limiting the liability of
an innkeeper applies only to his common law liability as an insurer and has no
application where the guest's cause of action is based solely on the negligence of
the innkeeper in caring for the property entrusted to him. In Sifflette v. Lilly, 130
W. Va. 297, 43 S.E.2d 289 (1947), where plaintiff had clothing valued at $500
stolen from her room, the court held that when the loss is the result of negligence
of the innkeeper, the statutory limit does not apply. See 29 Am. JUR. Innkeepers
§ 89 (1960). Contra, Goodwin v. Georgian Hotel Co., 197 Wash. 173, 84 P.2d 681
(1938), holding that a statute limiting innkeeper's liability to $1000 applies
to losses caused by theft of the innkeeper's employees or gross negligence of the
innkeeper or his employees, but does not apply in case of theft by the innkeeper.
16. Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Royale Inv. Co., 393 S.W.2d 43 (St. L. Mo. App.
1965).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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principles, is a contradiction in terms.
As a further reason for denying the hotel protection under the statute, the
court held the innkeeper statute inapplicable because defendant was merely a bailee
for hire.17 The court did not explain the reason for so holding, but it is submitted
that the only explanation for this decision can be that the disclaimer clause on the
claim check relieved defendant of its absolute liability as an innkeeper and im8
posed only the liability of a bailee for hire.'
Prior cases holding an innkeeper merely a bailee have been confined primarily
to instances where the relationship was not that of innkeeper and guest,1 as
where a guest checks out and leaves property in custody of the hotel.20 With
respect to automobiles, a bailee for hire relationship has been held to exist where
the guest's automobile is placed in a lot or garage operated by someone other than
the hotel.21 But, even in this instance, the hotel may be subject to absolute liability if the guest is not aware of the hotel's relationship with the private garage,
and could reasonably assume that the automobile was still in the custody of the
22
hotel.
Upon examining the rule of strict liability of a hotel for property infra
hospitium retained by the majority of jurisdictions, one is likely to conclude that
here lies the perfect example of a rule outliving its reason-travel conditions of the
fifteenth century, characterized by highwaymen and robbers and their opportunity
for combination with dishonest innkeepers. However, upon closer examination one
can see that a reason for the rule still exists. There is greater travel today than
ever before and a guest is in no better position to protect himself. As was stated
in Shifflette v. Lilly:23 "If the door is open to fraudulent and dishonest practices,
it may be expected that they will creep in and prevail." It must be remembered
that the same rules apply to both one dollar per night "hotels" and the Hilton
chain. Thus, a strong policy argument can still be made for making hotels absolutely liable for property of guests infra kospitium, and for strictly construing
statutes such as Missouri's, when in derogation of this absolute liability.
ROBERT M. MODEER

17. Id. at 47.
18. See, e.g., Nuell v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70 (St. L. Mo. App.
1962). 8 AM. JUR. 2d Bailments § 206 (1963).
19. E.g., Ross v. Kirkeby Hotels, Inc., 160 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1957). Plaintiff was
attending a wedding at the hotel. The case is unusual because defendant hotel
tried to show the relationship of innkeeper-guest in order to limit liability under
statute.
20. Rosin v. Central Plaza Hotel, Inc., 345 Ill. App. 411, 103 N.E.2d 381
(1952); Alex W. Rothchild & Co. v. Lynch, 171 La. 114, 129 So. 725 (1930); Oklahoma City Hotel Co. Inc. v. Levine, 189 Okla. 331, 116 P.2d 997 (1941) (further
holding a disclaimer clause will not relieve liability for negligence); Jackson v.
Steinberg, 186 Ore. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948); Dallas Hotel Co. v. Richardson, 276
S.W. 765 (Tex. 1925) (further holding a disclaimer clause will not relieve liability
for negligence).
21. See, Zurich Fire Ins. Co. v. Weil, 259 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1953); Kallish v.
Meyer Hotel Co., 182 Tenn. 29, 184 S.W.2d 45 (1944); Hallman v. Federal Parking Services, 134 A.2d 382 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1957).
22. See, Andrew Jackson Hotel, Inc. v. Platt, 19 Tenn. App. 360, 89 S.W.2d
179 (1935); Hallman v. Federal Parking Services, supra note 21.
23. Supra note 15.
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TORTS-PARENTAL LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF MINOR CHILD
National Dairy Products Corp. v. Fresckhi
Action by corporate truck owner and servant driver filed jointly against
minor child and parents alleging damages to delivery truck and its contents and
minor physical injuries to truck driver. Plaintiffs' petition stated that while servant
was making daily milk deliveries he observed defendant child, three years of age,
enter the truck and release the brake. The driver was injured when he attempted
to enter and stop the rolling vehicle.
Summary judgment for defendant child was granted by the trial court. Plaintiffs failed to perfect their appeal on this judgment,2 and this issue was not considered on appeal.
The petition alleged that defendant parents had knowledge that their child
had the propensity to enter and attempt to drive trucks and that the parents had
negligently failed to restrain him. However, plaintiffs' opening statement admitted
that they were unable to find any evidence that the child had previously been
known to climb into and start vehicles. At the close of plaintiffs' opening statement, the trial court granted defendant parents' motion for directed verdict.
Plaintiffs appealed this judgment.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdict stating that
plaintiffs had the burden of proving: (1) the child's propensity to do this type
of act; and (2) parental knowledge of such propensity. 3 Plaintiffs' allegations indicated that in the past the child had climbed into several sewers and manholes as
well as a window of a neighboring home and that on the day in question, he
probably escaped through his nursery window. Plaintiffs failed to establish a cause
of action because their opening statement conceded they could find no evidence
to show the child had ever been known to climb into and start an automobile
or truck. Such admission was fatal to their action and the lower court correctly
granted the directed verdict.
Since this was a case of first impression in Missouri, the court carefully reviewed authorities of other jurisdictions. They concluded that their decision conformed to the generally accepted common law principle that parents are not liable
for the torts of their minor child merely because of their relationship. 4 The child,
however, may be liable for his own tort.5 There are certain exceptions to this corn1. 393 S.W.2d 48 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Id. at 50. The ground for the motion was that the petition stated that
the child was three years old and in Missouri there could be no recovery against
so young a person for negligence or carelessness.
3. Id. at 55.
4. Murphy v. Loeffier, 327 Mo. 1244, 39 S.W.2d 550 (1931); Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119 (1868). This decision was criticized in Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash.
241, 247, 281 Pac. 991, 993 (1929), the court stating that defendant could be too
young to be legally liable. Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S.E. 664
(1931). See PROSSER, TORTS § 117 (3rd ed. 1964). Cf. 67 CJ.S. Parent and Child
§ 66 (1950); 39 AM. JuR. Parent and Child § 55 (1942); Annot., 155 A.L.R. 85
(1945).
5. Paul v. Hummel, supra note 4, at 121. See HARPER, TORTS § 283 (1933);
PROSSER, TORTS §§ 117, 128 (3rd ed. 1964). "The infant, as a separate legal indiPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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mon law rule under which recovery may be had from the parent for the torts of
his child. 6 The court in the noted case quoted7 these exceptions from Steinberg v.
Cauchois,s a leading New York case [footnotes 9 to 17 added]:
(1) where the relationship of master-servant exists9 and the child is acting within the scope of his authority accorded by the parent;' 0
(2) where the parent is negligent in intrusting to the child an instrument
which, because of its nature, use and purpose, is so dangerous"l as to constitute in the hands of the child, an unreasonable risk to others; 12
(3) where a parent is negligent in intrusting to the child an instrumentality which, though not necessarily a dangerous thing of itself,'8
is likely to be put to a dangerous use14 because of the known propensities
of the child; 15
(4) where the parent's negligence consists entirely of his failure reasonably to restrain the child from vicious conduct imperiling others, when
the parent has knowledge of the child's propensity toward such conduct; 16 and
vidual, has been held liable for his own torts, and the parent has, at common law,
no legal responsibility for them." PROSSER, sUpra, § 117, at 892.
6. See HARPER, TORTS § 283 (1933); Cf. 28 TUL. L. Rav. 503 (1954).

7. National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Freschi, supra note 1, at 54.
8. 249 App. Div. 518, 519, 293 N.Y.S. 147, 149 (1937). Defendant child held
accountable for the negligent operation of a bicycle on the sidewalk in violation
of municipal ordinance. Judgment against parents reversed on law. The court
held that none of the exceptions to the general rule could be inferred from the
evidence. The dissent would have held the mother liable because she had sufficient
knowledge of the child's actions and failed to restrain him.
9. Murphy v. Loeffler, supra note 4 (parent liable under respondeat superior).
10. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 67 (1950); 39 AM. JUR. Parent and Child

§ 57 (1942).
11. Baker v. Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219 (1857) (parents held not liable for child
assaulting plaintiff with knife); Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S.D. 237, 76 N.W. 933
(1898) (parent held liable for giving child a rifle).
12. Charlton v. Jackson, 183 Mo. App. 613, 620, 167 S.W. 670, 671 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1914). The court said: "No one can doubt that, if the father knows his
indiscreet minor son of tender years is using a firearm in such careless and negligent manner as to endanger the safety of others about him, it is his duty to interpose the parental authority to prevent injury to such persons as may, within the
range of reasonable probability, be exposed to injury therefrom."
13. In Capps v. Carpenter, 129 Kan. 462, 283 Pac. 655 (1930), the court held
a spring gun which shoots "B-B" size pellets was not a dangerous instrumentality.
14. Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, 198 N.W. 738 (1924) (minor operating motorcycle in violation of statute).
15. Bieker v. Owens, 350 S.W.2d 522 (Ark. 1961). In Norton v. Payne, 154
Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929) a new trial was granted, the court holding
there was sufficient evidence to warrant submitting to the jury the issues of
child's previous habits (throwing sticks at other children) and knowledge of such
acts by the parents. In Staruck v. County of Otsego, 285 App. Div. 476, 478, 138
N.Y.S.2d 385, 387 (1955), the doctrine was extended to state government and
political subdivisions standing in loco parentis to children in their custody.
16. Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953); Caldwell v.
Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 592, 183 N.E.2d 706, 707 (1962). In reversing defendant's
demurrer, the court in Caldwell said: "This duty of parental discipline arises when
the parent knows or should know of the child's propensity for the type of harmful conduct complained of, and has an opportunity to take reasonable corrective
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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(5) where the parent participates in the child's tortious act by consenting to it or by ratifying it later and accepting the fruits. 17
In the first exception, liability is predicated upon the ordinary agency or respondeat superior theories, while the fifth exception relates to liability of a joint
tortfeasor. In exceptions two, three and four, liability is that of ordinary negligence. Consequently, the parents are not liable for the act of the child himself,
they are liable for their own wrongdoing or fault' 8 in not exercising due care to
restrain their child and prevent such injury. Exceptions number three and four
make it imperative that the parents have sufficient knowledge or notice of their
child's prior activity or propensity. 19
The St. Louis Court of Appeals then concluded:
We think the rule that may be safely laid down is that where the parents
had knowledge of the child's habits, traits or propensities toward the commission of a particular tort and they failed to exercise supervision and
control over the child in connection with the commission of the particular
type of wrongful act and subsequently a similar act resulted in injury to
20
a complainant liability may be imposed upon the parents.
The court also considered Gissen v. Goodwill,21 a Florida case of first impression, which closely approximated the instant case. That action was by a hotel
employee for injuries sustained when defendant's eight year old child slammed
a door on his hand. The Florida court affirmed the judgment for defendants, stating that no cause of action was alleged. Although plaintiff did allege certain specific acts of misconduct on the part of the child, he failed to allege that the child
was in the habit of slamming doors. The court said: "A deed brought on by a
totally unexpected reaction to a situation which is isolated of origin and provocation could not have been foretold or averted and hence could not render the
22
parents responsible."
The civil law of Louisiana, patterned in the traditional fashion of the statutory
civil law of France, appears to place vicarious liability upon the parents for the
measures." Cf. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 68 (1950); 39 AM.

JUR. Parent and

Child § 58 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 316 (1965).

17. Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D. Idaho, 1930) (parents held liable for
knowledge and encouraging their child in beating other children).
18. In Bateman v. Crim, 34 A.2d 257, 258 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943), the court
relieved the parents of liability for child who ran into the plaintiff while playing
football on sidewalk: "In our opinion, to render a parent responsible for injuries
resulting from the wrongful acts of a minor, his negligence in the exercise of
parental supervision must have some specific relation to the act complained of,
which is lacking in the present case." Accord, Condell v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d
51 (1944) (negligence of the parent must be the proximate cause of the injury-a
natural and probable consequence of the failure to exercise control over the child).
19. Martin v. Barrett, 120 Cal. App.2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (1953). In affirming
defendant's demurrer, the court stated that no habitual, intentional or specific misconduct was alleged.
20. National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Freschi, supra note 1, at 57.
21. 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
22. Id. at 705.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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acts of their minor children. 23 This statutory liability was discussed and contrasted with the common law by the Missouri Supreme Court in Baker v. Haldman.24 The court noted that even under the civil law of Louisiana a father may
defend against such recovery by showing that he was unable to prevent the acts
of his child.2 5 This phrase itself indicates some fault on the part of the father.
The liability of parents, under the civil law of Louisiana, has been held to
be the consequence of parental authority rather than an attribute of parentage. 20
Fault of the parent2 7 or of the child is a requisite for parental liability. Parents
cannot be held responsible for injuries accidentally inflicted by their children. 28
In Phillips v. D'Amico, 20 the parent was held responsible when his minor child
carelessly shot an airgun, striking plaintiff in the eye with a "B-B" shot. The
court said:
While neither Article 2317 nor Article 2318, contains the word "fault"
or the word "negligence," never, so far as we know, has either been interpreted as creating liability unless there is fault or negligence on the part
of someone; either on the part of persons "for whom we are answerable"
under Art[iclel 2317, or on the part of "minor or unemancipated children" under Art[icle 2318.30
If the minor be of such tender age as to be incapable of being guilty of
fault or negligence, then our Supreme Court has held that there is no
liability in the father unless he could have prevented the act which caused
the damage and failed to do so. 3'
It seems clear that the common law does not hold parents vicariously liable
for the actions of their children, save for the respondeat superior or agency exception. Personal fault of the parents is the basis of their liability. 82 Civil law also
requires fault as the basis of parental liability.33 That is, fault on the part of the
child by committing a willful or negligent (if legally capable) act and upon the
parent for the lack of exercising proper parental authority over the child.3 4
At times the common law doctrine may produce undesired results. For exam23. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1952).
24. Supra note 11, at 220.
25. Art. 2318 of Louisiana Civil Code reads as follows: "The father, or after
his decease, the mother, are [sic] responsible for the damage occasioned by their
minor or unemancipated children. . ...
26. Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934) (allegation that
three year old child bit an attending nurse's finger failed to state cause of action).
27. Kern v. Knight, 13 La. App. 194, 199, 127 So. 133, 137 (1930) (fault imputed to father when his son injured plaintiff while operating father's automobile
without permission).
28. Wagner v. Barbin, 12 La. App. 640, 641, 125 So. 766, 767 (1930).
29. 21 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 1945).
30. Id. at 750.
31. Ibid.
32. Condel v. Savo, supra note 18, at 353 (fault or negligence on part of the
parent).
33. Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917) (father held liable
by assuming the risk incidental to the inexperience and unskillfulness of the defendant's child handling a dangerous instrumentality, a rifle).
34. It appears that the case at bar would be similarly decided under civil law.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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ple a judgment rendered against a penniless infant will probably be uncollectable
and plaintiff's injuries will be substantially uncompensated. To avoid such hardships, many courts have indulged in various forms of judicial gymnastics to find
parental liability through dubious agency relationships or expanded forseeability
concepts.
Legislators have also been faced with this dilemma. In a time of ever increasing
juvenile delinquency and vandalism, the legislatures of an increasing number of
states have enacted statutes placing vicarious liability on the parents of children
who commit certain prohibited acts. Notable opposition to such legislation has
been clearly expressed; 3 5 nonetheless, a majority of our states have recently enacted statutes of this type relating to the willful, deliberate and vandalistic acts
of minor children. 36 While the statutes vary in procedure, each has a maximum
37
amount recoverable from the parents ranging from 300 dollars to 700 dollars
Missouri now has a statute of this type. 38 The statute (1) applies to willfully
marking, defacing or damaging any public or private real or personal property;
(2) places liability on the parent or guardian of any unemancipated minor in
their care or custody, against whom judgment has been rendered; (3) imposes
maximum parental liability not to exceed 300 dollars; and (4) requires that the
parent or guardian be joined as a party defendant in the original action. It should
be noted that this statute expressly provides "such payment shall not be a bar to
any criminal action or any proceeding against the unemancipated minor committing such damage for the balance of the judgment not paid by the parent or
guardian."
The courts have not passed on the constitutionality of this type of statute.
One argument for their constitutionality is made by analogy to the Family Automobile statutes, which have been upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police
power.39
Furthermore, the Missouri statute, substantially like those of many jurisdictions, applies to the willful destruction of property and not to personal injuries40
or negligent acts of children. Therefore, it would not apply in a situation similar
to the instant case, where the plaintiff bases his cause of action on the negligence
of the child.
RAYMOND E. SCHOENSTEIN
35. Freer, Parental Liability for Torts of Children, 53 Ky. LJ. 254 (1964).
Opinions of various governors vetoing such legislation are given: Governor Harriman of New York, at 260; Governor Rockefeller of New York, at 262; Governor
Kerner of Illinois, at 260; and Governor Brown of California, at 256 (increasing
California maximum from $300 to $1,000).
36. Id. at 265-66. 37. Id. Comprehensive appendix of various state statutes including details of
their provisions.
38. § 537.045, RSMo 1965 Supp. (Title: Parent or guardian liable for damage
to property by minor-wken-limitation.)
39. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co., 201
Minn. 44, 275 N.W. 416 (1937).
40. Several statutes apply to personal injuries as well as to property damages.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-572 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1956);
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 19 § 217
(1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-3. Cf. statutes cited note 37 sunpra.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1966], Art. 8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

TAXATION-LATE WAIVER OF FIDUCIARY COMMISSIONSA TAX TRAP
Rev. Rul. 64-2251 is concerned with a testamentary trust in which the three
co-trustees retained the annual commissions allowable on income under New York
law,2 and requested an allowance for the statutory principal commissions subsequent to the years in which they were earned. Later, in supplemental petitions,
two of the three trustees executed waivers of the principal commissions prior to
entry of the surrogate court decree.
The Internal Revenue Service ruled that under New York law the failure to
retain principal commissions did not constitute a waiver,3 that over a period of
several years services were performed, that personal dominion was exercised over
the additional principal commissions, and as a result the services performed were
not of a gratuitous nature. Cited as authority for the Ruling was Helvering v.
Horst,4 which held that the power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it, or as the court stated, "the fruit is not to be attributed to a different
tree from that on which it grew," 5 and Weil v. Commsuioner,0 setting out the
doctrine of constructive receipt which treats as taxable income any amount which
is subject to the demand of the taxpayer even though not actually paid.
Thus the commissions though not paid constituted income to the trustees.
And because the waiver increased the shares received by the beneficiaries, as a result of the reduced trust expense, it constituted a gift for federal gift tax purposes.
This Ruling was distinguished from Rev. Rul. 56-472T on the basis of intent
to render gratuitous services. In Rev. Rul. 56-472 an executor who was entitled
to a five per cent statutory commission entered into an agreement for less than
the statutory fee prior to performance of services without exercising any dominion
or control over the commissions so waived, and prior to the time in which he was
entitled to receive any commissions. The Revenue Service ruled that this manifested an intention to render gratuitous services. Since under state law the waiver
was binding, the difference between the amount to which he was entitled and what
he agreed to receive would not be considered as constructively received income
and would not constitute a gift.
The importance of the two Rulings can be readily seen because often it is advantageous to waive commissions which constitute taxable income s in order to increase the gift in the form of a bequest, devise, inheritance, or beneficiary's share
which is tax free. 9 In the typical situation, the wife as the executrix and sole beneficiary under her husband's will can increase her tax free inheritance by waiving
1. 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 15.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act 285-a2 (1928).
Iz re Mercereau's Estate, 180 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
IM. at 120.
173 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1949).

7. 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 21.

8. See, e.g., Rose v. Grant, 39 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1930).
9. INT. REv.

CODE OF

1954, § 102(a). Compare Clarke v. United States, 189

F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1951), where the executrix gave up her claim for commissions
so others would give up their claims, and the court held the commissions taxable
income.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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taxable commissions. Another family 'situation is where a son or daughter serving
as executor(trix) of a parent's will exercises his right of waiver, thereby reducing
taxable income and increasing tax free gifts to family beneficiaries. Although a
waiver situation usually involves family members, the advantages of increasing a
tax free gift by waiving commissions can be used by any fiduciary who is beneficiary of the trust or estate. The proper situation also exists where the
fiduciary is not a beneficiary yet the recipients are objects of his bounty'0 or someone else the fiduciary is interested in benefiting.
Commissions which have been paid or will be paid are an allowable deduction
on the estate tax return, or, if the executor so elects, on the estate's income tax
return.11 If a bequest is made in lieu of commissions, 12 or if commissions are
waived, the estate will lose the deduction. 13 If the fiduciary is in a high tax bracket,
a tax free gift may more than offset the loss of the commission deduction to the
estate or trust. Often it is difficult to determine at an early date which is the wiser
course of action. According to these two Rulings the waiver will have to be in
writing and before any services or duties which would indicate or imply a prior
acceptance or dominion over the amounts waived are performed. Several writers
have indicated that the best course of action is to file the written waiver with
the probate court so that a definite date will be established at the time the
fiduciary accepts his appointment. 14 One writer suggests that because of the early
time required for the waiver it is often desirable to delay probate for the allowable
time under local law in order to more readily ascertain whether a waiver would
be advantageous.' 5
Another situation that might present itself concerns an executor or trustee
who dies or resigns without a waiver being followed by a newly appointed fiduciary
who attempts to waive. Following the reasoning of the two Rulings it would seem
that before the newly appointed fiduciary comes in and exercises dominion or starts
performance, he should be able to waive his share of the applicable commissions
even if his predecessor did not.
Conceivably the argument could be made that a waiver was always intended
even though the waiver was made late or after services were rendered. However,
the success of such an argument seems questionable not only because of the difficulty of proving such an assertion, but because the Revenue Service seems to take
an objective view of all waivers, emphasizing the factor of timeliness. In other
words, if the waiver is before services are performed, the commissions will not be
taxable, but if it is after services are performed they will be taxable. As a result,
the taxpayer will probably meet with little success in making such an argument
particularly at the administrative level.
10. Evall, Hidden Estate Tax-Saving Technique Can Be Found in Interplay
of Tax Laws, 19 J. TAXATION 280, 285 (Nov. 1963).
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 642(g).
12. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b)(2).
13. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b)(1).
14. Stevens, How Post-Mortem Estate Planning Can Reduce Income and
Estate Taxes, 21 J. TAXATION 288; Price, Post-Mortem Estate Planning, N.Y.U.
15th INST. ON FFD. TAx 1029 (1957).
15. Price, supra note 14.
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An additional problem concerns whether or not the trust or estate is entitled
to deduct those commissions not actually paid but which result in income to the
fiduciary and gifts to the beneficiaries as a result of an untimely waiver. Prior
cases have required that in order for there to be a deduction, commissions must
eventually be paid.O When commissions are waived by an executor and the waiver
is subsequently withdrawn a deduction has been allowed. 17 Likewise, if the deduction is allowed in advance of payment and is thereafter waived, it has been held
that the executor must pay the resulting tax.' 8 Also, when one co-executor waives
and the commission is paid to the other co-executors without diminution under
local law, all will be deductible. 19 However, with one exception, 20 where there is no
reasonable expectation that the commissions will ever be paid, courts have denied
the deduction, 2 1 and the Regulations so provide. 22 Still there is the possibility that
in the future the courts will depart from the requirement of payment and allow
the deduction because of the application of the doctrine of constructive receipt.
Rev. Rul. 64-22523 should serve as a warning to the lawyer in formulating an
estate plan or drawing a will to inform the interested parties of the importance of
timeliness if commissions are to be waived. Only in this manner can the tax
24
trap of the last minute waiver by the fiduciary be avoided.
WILLIAM H. WALKER*
*EDITOR'S Norn: Since this note went to press, Revenue Ruling 66-167 has
been promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service. It provides that an executor
or other fiduciary in a similar situation can waive his fees without incurring income or gift tax liability. The test is whether the waiver will at least primarily
constitute evidence of an intent to render gratuitous services. If it serves any
other important objective, it may then be held that the fiduciary has enjoyed a
realization of income by controlling the disposition thereof, and has also made a
taxable gift of his interest in the assets under his control.
Gratuitous intent will usually be held to have been shown if a formal waiver
is made by the fiduciary within six months of his appointment. There may also
be an implied waiver if the fiduciary does not claim fees at the time of filing his
accountings, and the other facts and circumstances are consistent with a fixed
intention to serve on a gratuitous basis.
Revenue Ruling 56-472 is clarified and Revenue Ruling 64-225 is distinguished.
16. See, e.g., Leo J. Dutcher, 34 T.C. 918 (1960); Laird v. Commissioner, 38
B.T.A. 926, 943 (1938).
17. Siegel, P-H 7 B.T.A.M. 138,346 (1938).
18. See, e.g., John E. Cain, 43 B.T.A. 1133 (1941); John F. Degener, 26
B.T.A. 185 (1932).
19. I. H. Burney, 4 T.C. 449 (1944).
20. W. C. Van Hoozer Est., 21 B.T.A. 795 (1930). The court held the unpaid commissions deductible without giving its reasoning, and cited as authority
for this proposition cases holding payable commissions deductible.
21. See, e.g., Dutcher, s-pra note 16; Bretzfelder, 32 B.T.A. 146, 151 (1935).
22. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b).
23. Supra note 1.
24. It has been assumed by many that Rev. Rul. 64-225 will apply with
equal impact to executor's fees. At least at the administrative level, it seems from
these two Rulings that the Internal Revenue Service will treat the two as the same.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/8
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